Alabama: Lack of Competition and Election Skepticism Down South

A key aspect of the political ethos of the state of Alabama is the notion that it is set apart from the federal government, and thereby from the rest of the nation. A recent political commercial by Governor Kay Ivey underscored that “Washington is a mess” and that she would protect Alabama values, “not theirs.” The theme that, as the state slogan notes, “We dare defend our rights” (especially from the outside) is a common one in Alabama politics, but the essential shape and health of democratic governance in the state is very similar to the rest of the United States.  These similarities manifest in the basic political institutions as well as in the nationalized nature of the partisan narratives that have dominated the 2022 electoral season.

On the one hand, the overall function of Alabama’s democracy has been steady in the last several decades and certainly has been an improvement over the pre-Voting Rights Act era (but in this pattern also echoes the rest of the country).  Of course, it is worth noting that it was Shelby County, Alabama that was named in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the case that significantly weakened the Voting Rights Act. That case put the state in the middle of a debate over whether new voting rules required preclearance by the US Department of Justice. 

In terms of assessing the current state of democracy in Alabama, I would suggest focusing on two main areas:  the quality of representativeness, which is a long-term issue of American political institutions, and the nationalization of partisan politics (especially as linked to skepticism over elections in the wake of Donald Trump’s 2020 loss and subsequent lack of acceptance). 

We can start by saying that in broad brushstrokes, the general outcomes of elections are reflective of the basic political disposition of the state’s population, albeit skewed towards the majority party.  This is to say that Alabama is an overwhelmingly conservative state (deeply red in the current political parlance) and its elected government reflects this fact. When we move from the broad to fine, however, we see that like much of the country, Alabama has representativeness and competitiveness problems.

On a state level, there is no doubting that Alabama is heavily Republican.  For example, in 2020 the state voted 62.03% for Republican Donald Trump, 36.57% for Democrat Joe Biden, and 1.39% for others. Those results track with the way the state has voted for president since 2000:  an average of 61.49% for the Republicans, 36.97% for Democrats, and 1.54% for others. If we look at US Senate and gubernatorial contests, we see a similar number.  For example, in the 2018 governor’s race, 59.5%% voted for Republican Kay Ivey and 40.4% for Democrat Walt Maddox (the two previous contests saw Republicans win 64%-36% and 58%-42%). 

As such, it is not unfair to assess the ratio of Republicans to Democrats in the state to be around 6:4, if not slightly more Republican. Indeed, if we look at the 2020 US House vote, the ratio is closer to 7:3, but this is largely the result of non-competitive elections and in several cases, unopposed contests (more below but in simple terms, the lack of Democratic candidates in two races skews the statewide vote totals).

When we look at electoral outcomes, therefore, it is certainly appropriate, from a democratic theory point of view, that the Republican Party should dominate outcomes. But, as we see in much of American politics nationally, there are problems with both representation and, relatedly, competitiveness. 

Let’s look at both the state’s US House delegation and the state legislature in terms of partisans breakdowns and competitiveness.

Alabama has seven US House seats.  If those seats were allocated proportionally based on the state’s partisan breakdown of ~60:40, the delegation ought to be four Republicans and three Democrats (even using the 70:30 ratio, the delegation should be split five to two).  Instead, that ratio is six Republicans and one Democrat (i.e., 86% of the state’s House delegation is Republican). What we see here is a pathology common across the US:  the way in which single-seat districts limit competitiveness both naturally and by design.  

In terms of the natural distribution of voters, Democrats are heavily concentrated in cities, and single-seat districts tend to blunt the impact of cities in general.  Moreover, long-term residential patterns dating back to the plantation/slavery era concentrate Black residents along the Black Belt of the state (so-called due to the soil), which makes up a substantial portion of the heavily-Democratic Seventh District. 

The “by design” part of the equation is that the districts have been gerrymandered by the Republican-controlled state legislature to maximize Republican outcomes.  The aforementioned Seventh District, for example, not only contains substantial portions of the Black Belt but is drawn in a way that taps into heavily Black neighborhoods in the state capital, Montgomery, as well as significant portions of the Birmingham metro area.  It is a classic case of packing a district with partisan affiliates.

Indeed, all seven of Alabama’s congressional districts in the 2020 elections were non-competitive because each was heavily tilted towards one party.   The closest race was in AL01, which the Republican candidate won by a margin of 28.83%. The average margin of victory across all seven races was 62.73% and three of the races only had one of the major parties running a candidate.  In the simplest of terms:  there is no competition for US House seats in Alabama, but instead, the district lines dictate the outcome, so the only contests of significance would have been at the primary level.  These same parameters will be in play with the new maps going into effect for the 2022 contests.

Again, if Alabama’s House elections were anything close to proportional, the seat distribution should be far closer to 4:3 (or even 5:2, at a generous interpretation of partisan distribution) than 6:1.

If we look at the state legislature, we see a similar story.  The legislature elected in 2018 had the following partisan breakdowns.  The State Senate was 27 Republicans and eight Democrats or 77.14% to 22.86%.  The State House of Representatives was 77 Republicans and 28 Democrats (73.33% to 26.67%).  

On the competitiveness front, 53 of the 105 members of the Alabama House ran unopposed and the average margin of victory for the remaining 52 was 37.13%.  Only four races (Districts 3, 65, 85, and 47) had margins in the single digits.  In the State Senate, 18 of 35 seats were unopposed and the average margin of victory in the remaining 17 districts was 30.92% with only two districts (the 2nd and the 6th) with margins in the single digits. 

Again, we see here that while the state is heavily Republican, the way the lines are drawn emphasizes that advantage disproportionately (and results in general election contests that are not competitive).

The Princeton Gerrymandering Projects assesses the new maps drawn in 2021 to contain four competitive state house districts and two in the state senate.

The racial breakdowns of the state legislative delegations are also striking.  In the state senate, the Republican delegation is all white, and there is only one white member of the Democratic delegation.  In the state house, there is one Black Republican and one white Democrat.

In general, it is fair to say that US House and state legislative elections in Alabama are non-competitive affairs that over-represent the majority party relative to the parties’ statewide voting strength. These circumstances are a direct result of the usage of single-seat districts with plurality rules as exacerbated by partisan districting processes and party primaries as nominating vehicles (and hence transferring what competition to the primaries away from the general).  In short, these are common deficiencies in the quality of representative democracy across the United States.

We can also see national party politics permeate the state despite the self-perception that local politics are unique (again, a common reality across the fifty states).  Given the dominance of the Republican Party in the state, the GOP primaries for statewide offices such as governor and US Senate were focused on national issues linked substantially to party identity.  The Republican gubernatorial campaigns, for example, were focused on criticizing President Biden.  The US Senate nomination contest between US Representative Mo Brooks and Katie Britt (the chief of staff of outgoing Senator Richard Shelby) was a national story over the question of former president Trump’s endorsement (or withdrawal thereof for Brooks, who nonetheless campaigned as “MAGA Mo Brooks”). In all cases candidates gave rhetorical support to Trump’s assertion that the 2020 election was stolen, which is just part of the national erosion of trust in American democratic processes.

The Republican primary for Secretary of State, the chief elections officer, likewise dealt with those themes.  The second-place finisher, outgoing State Auditor Zeigler told the Associated Press in an interview, “I’m not an election denier. I’m an election questioner.” He was endorsed by election conspiracy theorist and My Pillow CEO Mike Lindell.  The winner of the nomination, State Representative Wes Allen campaigned on his opposition to curbside voting and no-excuse vote-by-mail.

In general, I think it is fair to say that the basic mechanisms of voting in the state are sound and that votes are cast and counted legitimately and properly. But in terms of the democratic quality of the process, like in much of the United States (where the Cook Political Report puts only 33 of 435 House seats as true toss-ups) the general election contests are dictated more by how the line on the map is drawn than the actual overall partisan breakdown of the state.  This lack of representation of the citizenry’s interests and the lack of real competition for political office are both significantly concerning from a democratic theory point of view.

In terms of a less structural issue, the fact that local politicians are participating in the national political rhetoric surrounding the 2020 elections and unfounded charges of electoral fraud is also concerning in terms of democratic health. Such views also have implications for policy decisions, as the dominance of electoral fraud rhetoric will translate in public policy decisions more likely to make voting more difficult than to make it easier.